是时候直面事实了：市场不只是在看空欧元，也在考验欧洲一体化计划本身。上周二的法德最高领导人会晤显示，领导人物越是重复那些过时的“灵丹妙药”——比如不可能发行欧元债券，他们的话就越没人信。默克尔(Merkel)和萨科齐(Sarkozy)提出的建议旨在掩盖分歧（德国对于欧元债券和债务上限的谨慎态度，平衡了法国在欧元区经济治理问题上施加的压力）和赢得时间，但过去几个月的经验表明，这种零敲碎打的方式只能增加长远解决方案的成本。要想自救，欧盟(EU)必须停止查找漏洞和攻击表面病症，而是应当认真应对自身的根本设计缺陷北京翻译公司。

自从2005年法国和荷兰投票否决了《欧盟宪法条约》以来，亲欧派们的表现就像那个用手指堵住堤坝的神奇小男孩——因担心欧洲怀疑论的“洪水”决堤而不肯让步。因此，他们一直在捍卫这令人不满又无法维续的现状：有共同货币，却没有财政部的支持；有共同边界，却没有统一的移民政策；技术官僚制定的外交政策与国家权力的源头背道而驰。

正面解决这些问题是防止解体趋势由欧元向欧盟蔓延的唯一方式。然而，这么做意味着首先必须放弃“单速欧洲”的梦想。欧盟成员国长期以来的发展速度不尽相同，但现在它们需要一个制度框架来规范“多速”的未来。

欧盟不应掩盖分歧，而是需要采用一种模式，让行驶在快车道的成员国充当先锋，为整个欧洲一体化项目赋予新的目标。然而，即便是一个多速欧洲也需要更大规模的财政转移——最佳选择是债权国和债务国达成一项明确的协议。这么做不仅能够兼顾紧缩措施与债务缩减，还可以形成一种在经济自由化和社会保护之间找到平衡的愿景深圳英语翻译。

It is time to face facts: markets are not just betting against the euro but testing the European project itself. Tuesday’s Franco-German summit showed that the more leaders repeat outdated nostrums – such as the impossibility of eurobonds – the less they are believed. The Merkel-Sarkozy proposals were an attempt to paper over differences (with Germanic prudence on eurobonds and debt ceilings balancing Gallic pressure for economic governance) and buy time, but the past few months have shown that this piecemeal approach will simply increase the cost of a long-term solution. To save itself, the European Union must stop seeking loopholes and attacking symptoms, and instead grapple seriously with its fundamental design faults.

Since the French and Dutch “no” votes in 2005, pro-Europeans have acted like the mythical boy with his finger in the dyke; unwilling to give ground for fear of a eurosceptic flood. As a result they have defended the unsatisfactory and unsustainable status quo: a currency not backed by a treasury; joint borders without a common migration policy; and a technocratic foreign policy divorced from national sources of power.

The only way to stop a tide of disintegration spreading beyond the euro to the EU itself is to tackle these problems head on. Doing so, however, means first giving up the dream of a one-speed Europe. EU nations have long travelled at different speeds, but now they need an institutional framework for a multi-speed future.

Rather than hiding this division, the EU now needs a model in which fast-lane nations act as pioneers who endow the whole project with new purpose. Yet even a multispeed Europe needs bigger fiscal transfers – the best option being an explicit deal between creditor and debtor nations. As well as reconciling austerity with debt support, this could develop a vision that balanced economic liberalisation with social protection.